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QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY 
OVERVIEW
In recent months the rate of expansion of the global economy has been firming, essentially 
owing to the improvement in the advanced economies. In any event, the medium-term 
outlook continues to point to relatively modest rates. In the advanced economies the 
ability of the expansionary monetary policy stance to alone sustain a more pronounced 
expansionary path for economic activity is showing certain limitations, given the scant 
contribution of other economic policies. Among the emerging economies, recent 
developments show some divergences across the different countries, reflecting factors 
such as dependence on external financing, the economic policy headroom available or the 
status of each economy as a commodities producer or consumer, against the background 
of the rise in commodities prices. 
Probably, the highlight on global financial markets in recent months has been the rise since 
October in sovereign bond yields from historically low levels, a trend that has stepped up 
notably following the US presidential election result. This has been accompanied by an 
increase, on a lesser scale, in expected inflation according to financial markets, against 
the backdrop of stronger expectations as to US policy interest rate rises. Confirmation of 
these expectations has begun to materialise with the Federal Reserve’s first decision along 
these lines on 14 December. The upward movement in long-term rates has been 
accompanied by other developments that include a strengthening of the dollar and, 
generally, increases in stock market prices in the advanced economies, especially in the 
financial sector. More recently, oil prices have been significantly boosted following the 
agreement reached on 30 November by the OPEC countries to restrict global crude oil 
production, with the producer countries that are not OPEC members subsequently 
following suit. This decision might have contributed, by boosting expected inflation, to 
bolstering the upward movement in sovereign debt yields. 
Despite the degree of improvement in worldwide economic developments and in the 
global short-term outlook, the most recent phase has been marked by the persistence of 
various risk factors. In particular, the uncertainty over the future course of global economic 
policies has increased notably, especially as regards the US economy, both in respect of 
trade and fiscal policy. Moreover, a potential steepening of the above-mentioned upward 
trajectory of long-term interest rates, along with their impact on prices in other financial 
markets, might jeopardise macrofinancial stability, in particular in the emerging economies 
with high dollar-denominated debt. 
In the euro area, the quarter-on-quarter growth rate of GDP climbed in Q3 to 0.3%, in line 
with expectations. The latest Eurosystem projections for December broadly paint a similar 
picture to those disclosed by the ECB  in September.1 Specifically, the latest forecasts 
point to a continuation of the expansion in economic activity in the 2017-19 period at a 
similar pace to that observed this year. With respect to inflation, the latest figures have 
been in line with expectations, although this has been the outcome of negative surprises 
in the underlying component and of positive ones in the energy component, which have 
tended to cancel one another out and which have fed into the Eurosystem projections for 
1  The projections for the euro area as a whole are available in December 2016: Eurosystem staff macroeconomic 
projections for the euro area. Those relating to the Spanish economy, which are part of the foregoing ones and 
have been prepared by Banco de España experts, can be viewed in Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish 
economy 2016-2018.
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the coming years. These projections, which envisage HICP inflation standing at 1.7% on 
average in 2019, were one of the factors taken into consideration by the ECB Governing 
Council in deciding, on 8 December, to extend its asset purchase programme to December 
next year, at least, with the announcement being accompanied by certain technical 
adjustments so as to smooth the programme’s application. 
In Spain, economic activity has continued to post a high rate of increase in recent months. 
Specifically, in Q4, GDP is expected to have grown by 0.7%, unchanged on the rate 
observed in Q3 (see Chart 1) and underpinned by the strength of domestic spending. In 
particular, the continuation of the intense process of employment generation and the 
persistence of favourable financial conditions are estimated to have continued sustaining 
household spending on consumer goods and services, at a similar pace to that of the 
recent past. Investment by non-financial corporations is expected to have gained in 
strength, following its somewhat subdued moderate path in Q3. In a similar fashion, the 
coincident indicators of investment in construction suggest this demand component has 
picked up, following the easing in growth observed in Q3 according to QNA figures.
The as yet very limited information available points to a potential increase in trade in goods 
with the rest of the world in Q4, following the notable slowdown in the summer. That would 
reflect, in particular, greater firmness in export and import flows vis-à-vis the emerging 
economies as a whole. Should the scant information available be confirmed, there would 
be some easing in the net contribution of the external balance, which was marginally 
positive in the preceding quarter.
The uncertainty over the course of economic policies in Spain has tended to abate with the 
formation of a Government, following the lengthy spell covering most of the year in which 
a caretaker government was in office. In particular, in the fiscal policy realm, Parliament 
has approved the Royal Decree Law dated 2 December which defines a package of 
budgetary consolidation measures. While these measures may entail some short-term 
cost in terms of activity, it is a priority to redress the budgetary imbalance and lessen the 
Spanish economy’s vulnerability, given its dependence on foreign financing. However, 
some uncertainty persists over the definition of the structural reforms agenda, such 
reforms being needed to durably raise the rate of expansion of activity and of employment 
creation. 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND CONSUMER PRICES (a) CHART 1
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Consumer prices have risen significantly in recent months, posting positive rates as from 
September. In November, the year-on-year rate of change of the CPI stood at 0.7%. That 
reflected the impact of the trajectory of oil prices on the energy component, while core 
inflation has in recent months held on the approximately stable path characterising it since 
mid-2015. The negative gap between Spanish inflation and that of the euro area, which 
before the summer stood at around 1 pp, has narrowed significantly in recent months and 
stood at -0.1 pp in November. This is the outcome of the path followed by the inflation 
differential of the energy component, which from being negative by more than 5 pp at the 
start of the summer turned slightly positive in November, while in terms of core inflation, a 
small negative gap has been maintained. If the latest path of oil prices holds, inflation 
might stand comfortably above 2% in the opening months of 2017. In any event, insofar 
as this rise in inflation is prompted by changes in oil prices, it is foreseen that the increase 
will essentially be temporary. 
The Report includes six boxes devoted, respectively, to analysing the potential policies the 
new US Administration may implement from next year, along with the implications for the 
world economy (Box 1); the room for manoeuvre available for introducing a more 
expansionary fiscal policy stance in the euro area (Box 2); the impact of the base effects 
derived from the path of the oil price on the recent trajectory of the inflation rate (Box 3); 
new fiscal policy developments in Spain (Box 4); the recent trend of the Spanish economy’s 
financial account and international investment position (Box 5); and the results of the latest 
ECB half-yearly survey on the access of Spanish SMEs to external financing (Box 6). 
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The United States presidential and legislative elections held on 8 
November 2016 gave an unexpected triumph to Donald Trump 
and a Republican majority both in the House of Representatives 
and the Senate. Although the initial reaction of the financial 
markets was adverse, in a few hours the trend reversed in the main 
advanced economies. In fact, all of their stock exchanges recorded 
rises, although of differing magnitude (see accompanying Chart). 
The main US stock market indices reached all-time highs, most 
notably in those industries where firms would benefit more from 
the policies announced by Trump during the election campaign 
(banking, construction, health care and those more exposed to the 
domestic market), while sectors more sensitive to interest rate 
increases and/or non-cyclical in nature did not perform so well 
(utilities or shares of technology companies). 
However, the main effects are being seen in the government bond 
markets of developed countries, where yields have risen, 
particularly in the United States, and the slope of the yield curve is 
now steeper. These increases in yields were principally due to a 
higher term premium which, as the accompanying Chart shows, in 
the United States accounts for around 75% of the increase in ten-
year bond yields, while inflation expectations have increased by 
approximately 0.25 pp. The expected path of future official interest 
rates was also revised upward.
In the foreign exchange markets, the sustained trend of the dollar 
to appreciate has gained strength, especially against the yen, 
among developed countries’ currencies, and against the Mexican 
peso, among emerging economies (see attached Chart). In fact, 
the reaction of emerging markets was unfavourable, particularly in 
those countries that might be more affected by the new US 
policies, such as Mexico, or that are more dependent on external 
financing, such as Turkey.  In this group of countries, in addition to 
adverse movements in sovereign spreads and in equity market 
prices, there have been strong capital outflows since the election 
result was announced. 
Developments in financial markets appear to factor in the 
materialisation of certain proposals made by president-elect 
Trump during the election campaign. Although many of these are 
vague, the changes announced in fiscal, trade and migration 
policy are noteworthy. Trump’s proposals in fiscal policy would 
entail a decline of approximately $5.3 billion over ten years (CRFB 
calculations1) in tax income mainly from higher-income taxpayers 
and from corporate income tax.2 As regards government expenditure, 
the aim would be to maintain it overall, but giving more weight to 
investment in infrastructure (partially private, but introducing tax 
incentives) and to military expenditure (see accompanying Chart). 
Trade policy proposals are protectionist: rejection of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA), renegotiation of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and higher tariffs (especially 
on China and México, to reduce the trade deficit with these 
countries). In migration policy, candidate Trump was very belligerent 
towards undocumented immigrants (there are an estimated 11 
million in the United States) and announced that the legal entry of 
immigrants would become harder in the future.
Significant effects on the US economy may be expected if the 
proposals in these three fields are fully implemented. In the short term, 
the impact of the fiscal expansion, with a positive effect on GDP and 
inflation, would predominate. However, at medium and long term, the 
adverse effects on economic activity of a decline in trade and in the 
labour force, which has a strong immigrant component, would gain 
weight. Inflation would continue to rise, since domestic productive 
capacity would be lower and imported goods would be more 
expensive. The new economic policy stance in the United States would 
have significant cross-border effects, mainly as a result of curtailing 
trade, especially if other countries were to retaliate. Additionally, the 
impact abroad of the fiscal stimulus and the appreciation of the dollar 
would be partially offset by the induced increase in interest rates. 
Donald Trump’s far-reaching economic policy proposals, many of 
which depart markedly from those traditionally embraced by the 
Republican Party (e.g. trade and immigration policies), have sparked 
much uncertainty about their effective implementation. This is why his 
tax proposals are considered more likely to materialise, albeit on a 
smaller scale than that announced during the campaign.
BOX 1 THE FINANCIAL MARKETS AFTER THE UNITED STATES PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS AND THE 
IMPACT OF POTENTIAL ECONOMIC POLICY CHANGES
1  The  CRFB (Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget) is an 
independent non-profit, bi-partisan organisation that analyses federal 
fiscal issues. 
2  Income tax brackets would be reduced from seven to three (with a 
maximum tax rate of 33% against the current 39.6%); the maximum tax 
rate for capital gains and dividends would be 20%; federal estate and 
gift taxes would be eliminated, as would the tax on high-income earners 
that was approved to help pay for the Affordable Care Act. The corporate 
income tax rate would be lowered from 35% to 15% and firms would be 
allowed to repatriate earnings at a single rate of 10%.
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BOX 1 THE FINANCIAL MARKETS AFTER THE UNITED STATES PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS AND THE 
IMPACT OF POTENTIAL ECONOMIC POLICY CHANGES (cont’d)
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On 16 November, in the framework of the European semester, the 
European Commission published a communication recommending 
the adoption of a more expansionary fiscal policy across the euro 
area in order to support the ECB’s monetary policy and address 
the risks posed by the persistence of a scenario of low growth and 
inflation. In this context the Commission points out that the EMU’s 
current governance framework lacks instruments with which to 
manage the euro area’s overall fiscal policy directly, as it is the 
aggregate of the fiscal policies of its 19 member countries.
The draft budgetary plans member countries presented in mid-
October suggest an aggregate neutral fiscal policy stance in 2017, 
which could turn restrictive, at around 0.3% of GDP, if countries 
comply strictly with the requirements of the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) (see Chart 1). In the Commission’s opinion, the fragility 
of the economic recovery, the persistence of a substantial volume of 
idle resources, and the high level of uncertainty, make a more 
expansionary fiscal policy stance appropriate. Specifically, the 
Commission proposes a fiscal expansion of 0.5 pp of GDP in the 
euro area, which would allow 75% of the current output gap (which 
is still negative) to be closed. This stimulus should aim to boost 
public investment in those countries with fiscal space available 
thanks to the relatively healthy state of their public finances. In this 
regard, some recent analyses suggest that in the EMU’s current 
environment of low inflation and highly expansionary monetary 
policy, a fiscal expansion in part of the monetary union could have 
significant positive effects in the rest of the area.1
However, the Commission’s proposal is difficult to implement in 
the current framework defined by the SGP’s rules. The 
Commission’s own diagnosis of the budgets submitted for 2017 
points out that many of the area’s countries are at risk of 
breaching the SGP’s requirements, making any easing of their 
structural fiscal balances inappropriate. Consequently, a fiscal 
impulse on this scale would require a substantial expansion in 
just a few countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, 
whose public finances are in good health and whose levels of 
public debt are low. These countries, which are in a more 
favourable cyclical position than the EMU average, may not 
consider it expedient to carry out such a large stimulus, however. 
Moreover, the SGP does not have any instruments with which to 
induce Member States with fiscal space to use it.
In short, the merit of the Commission’s proposal is that it 
stimulates the debate on the optimal fiscal policy stance for the 
euro area as a whole. This is a debate to which the European 
Fiscal Board, which will soon be fully operational, has a 
mandate to contribute. But the proposal also highlights the 
difficulties of implementing a fiscal policy stance that, while 
compatible with the SGP’s rules, is considered optimal for the 
area as a whole, in the absence of a central budget or supra-
national fiscal capacity. In this connection, it should be recalled 
that the Commission has undertaken to set out concrete 
guidelines for the design of this common fiscal capacity in the 
white paper it is due to publish in the spring of 2017, as agreed 
in the Five Presidents’ Report.
BOX 2 TOWARDS AN EXPANSIONARY FISCAL POLICY IN THE EURO AREA?
1  See Arce, O., Hurtado, S., and C. Thomas (2016), Policy Spillovers and 
Synergies in a Monetary Union, International Journal of Central Banking, 
vol. 12, n.º 3, pp. 219‑277.
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In the last two years, inflation in Spain, proxied by the growth rate 
of the consumer price index (CPI), has posted negative values of 
-0.5% on average in 2015 and of -0.8% in the first half of 2016. 
This took place against a background of oil price collapse in the 
international markets, which had a direct impact on energy prices 
and, through these, also on consumer prices. In fact, Chart 1 
shows that the negative rate of change of the overall index from 
mid-2014 to August of this year is explained by the behaviour of the 
energy component, while the contribution from other goods and 
services is positive. The overall index excluding energy increased 
by 0.7% on average in 2015 and by 0.9% in the first half of 2016.
In September 2016 the year-on-year rate of change of the CPI became 
positive as a result of the energy component, and will foreseeably 
become more so in the coming months. This behaviour of inflation is 
partly a mechanical reflection of what is known in the literature as the 
base effect. Since the year-on-year rate of change of the CPI shows 
how this changes in a month with respect to the same month a year 
earlier, this rate is affected by what happened in the year-ago month, 
but also by what happened in the preceding 11 months. At the current 
point in time, this means that the inflation rate in the coming months 
will include the increase in oil prices from the low in January this year. 
Additionally, following the agreement to reduce supply by the OPEC 
and other producers, oil prices have risen on the international markets. 
This rise has fed through practically in full to the futures markets, 
which have maintained a certain positive slope (see Chart 2), thereby 
adding further momentum to the expected inflation rate.
Chart 3, which plots the month-on-month change in the energy CPI, 
shows that in late 2015 and early 2016 there were very negative month-
on-month rates linked to the behaviour of fuel prices, but also to those 
of electricity. Those price falls would explain, as a reflection of the 
aforementioned base effects, the rise in inflation observed in the latter 
months of this year. In a similar vein, Chart 4 breaks down the change 
in the year-on-year rate with respect to the previous month into the so-
called current effect, which captures the price variation due to 
contemporaneous factors (e.g. the recent announcement of the 
reduction in the world oil supply), and the base effect, which is due to 
BOX 3
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the behaviour in the same month a year earlier. It can be seen that the 
base effects were large between August and October of this year, and 
will again be large between December 2016 and February 2017. For its 
part, the recent rise in oil prices will also entail an upward revision of 
projections, albeit smaller than the previous one.
Against this background, the information received up to 14 
December indicates that in the coming months the year-on-year 
rate of change of the CPI will reach a high in February 2017, 
foreseeably above 2.5%. Also, the average inflation rate for 2017 
as a whole may exceed 2%, which will represent a considerable 
upward revision of the Banco de España’s latest projections based 
on the information available up to mid-November.1
This rise in inflation in the next few months will, in principle, be 
transitory, and the impact of the base effect on the year-on-year 
rate of change of the CPI will peter out over the course of the 
year, as indicated by the negative contribution of the base 
effect from March (see Chart 4). For this reason, the envisaged 
upward trend in inflation in the short term should not, by itself, 
have an impact on the monetary policy stance if the medium-
term inflation projections do not change. Indeed, for the 
increase in the rate of change of the energy component to have 
a more lasting impact, it would have to feed through to the 
prices of other goods and services and to wages. In this 
respect, it should be taken into account that a priority 
consideration in determining labour costs must be the need to 
persevere with the competitive advantages obtained in recent 
years in order to boost job creation.
BOX 3THE RECENT RISE IN INFLATION IN SPAIN AND THE SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK (cont’d)
1  Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2016-2019).
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The latest figures released on the general government sector in 
National Accounts terms refer to September 2016 and cover the 
central government, the regional governments and the Social 
Security system.1 According to that information, those sub-sectors 
combined posted a deficit of 3.3% of GDP in January-September, 
0.1 pp less than a year earlier (see Panel 1). The most recent data 
refer to the central government, showing that to October it had a 
deficit of 1.9% of GDP, which is an improvement of 0.1 pp on a 
year earlier. In turn, the data on revenue from taxes shared by 
central government and the regional and local governments, in 
budgetary accounting terms, show a sharp increase in October, 
owing to the impact on the second prepayment of corporate 
income tax of the regulatory changes introduced in late September 
(Royal Decree‑Law 2/2016). The latest projections prepared by the 
Directorate General Economics, Statistics and Research (DGEE, 
by its Spanish abbreviation),2 which take into account the latest 
available data3 and the annual impact of those regulatory changes, 
point to a combined general government deficit of 4.4% of GDP in 
2016.
General government debt as a proportion of GDP fell by 0.7 pp in 
2016 Q3 to 100.3%, as the rate of growth of GDP outpaced the 
small increase in liabilities (see Panels 2 and 3). This, together with 
the decrease in average financing costs, permitted a further 
moderate decline in the interest burden, to 2.9% as a proportion of 
GDP. The breakdown by instrument shows that the issuance of 
medium- and long-term securities continued to be the main 
financing channel for general government in Q3. By holder, the 
main net purchasers of securities issued by central government in 
the period were Spanish financial institutions other than credit 
BOX 4
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institutions. In this respect, both the Banco de España and (to a 
lesser extent) non‑residents made notable purchases, the former 
continuing to make large acquisitions of government debt in the 
secondary market as part of the Eurosystem asset purchase 
programme. Conversely, credit institutions, households and non-
financial corporations reduced their holdings of these instruments.
On 2 December the government set in train the preparatory cycle 
for the General State Budget for 2017, presenting to Parliament 
the budgetary stability targets for 2017-2019, the macroeconomic 
projections for that period and the approval of the central 
government expenditure ceiling for 2017. The targets for general 
government and its sub-sectors are 4.6%, 3.1%, 2.2% and 1.3% 
of GDP for the period 2016-2019, consistent with the deficit 
reduction path set by the Council of the European Union on 
8  August. The ceiling on central government non‑financial 
expenditure for 2017 has been set at €118,337 million.
Against this backdrop, the Council of Ministers also approved a 
package of extraordinary tax measures (Royal Decree‑Law 3/2016 
of 2 December 2016), validated by Parliament on 15 December, 
aiming to ensure that the official revenue forecast for 2017 is 
compatible with the budget deficit targets and the expenditure 
ceiling. These measures notably include the change to corporate 
income tax, broadening the tax base, which the government 
expects will have an impact of €4.65 billion on revenue. In 
particular, the offset of prior years’ losses has been confined to 
firms with turnover of more than €20 million and limits have been 
placed on their use of double taxation tax credits, and the 
deduction of losses on holdings in resident and non-resident 
entities has been eliminated. Second, in the case of excise duties, 
the tax rate on alcoholic beverages has been raised by 5%, in the 
tax on tobacco products, the weight of the specific component 
with respect to the ad valorem component has been increased, 
taking it closer to the European average, and a tax on sugary soft 
drinks has been announced, to be introduced in the course of 
2017. Third, as regards the social security system, the maximum 
limit and the maximum contribution bases have been raised by 
3%. Lastly, various measures have been adopted to boost the 
fight against fraud and improve tax management.
To conclude, on 9 December the government submitted an update 
of the General Government Budget Plan for 2017 to the European 
Commission. This includes a full projection of public revenue and 
expenditure for 2017, consistent with the general lines of the draft 
budgets of the various tiers of government and with the new 
macroeconomic projections. In particular, the Budget Plan 
contains the corrective tax measures described above. These 
measures, which were not included in the Banco de España’s 
latest projections report,4 as they were approved subsequently, 
should help to significantly curb the budget deficit, with a target of 
3.1% of GDP, in 2017.
BOX 4DEVELOPMENTS IN GENERAL GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTS (cont’d)
4  To access the projections, click on this link.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 13 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, DECEMBER 2016 QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
In the first half of 2016, the Spanish economy’s negative net 
international investment position (IIP) increased slightly (by €2.4 
billion), although relative to GDP it fell by 1.4 percentage points, 
to 88.5%, thanks to the growth in GDP (see Panel 1 of this box 
and Chart 16 in the main text of the Spanish version of this 
report). The slight increase in the negative net IIP was the result 
of an increase linked to valuation changes of external assets 
and liabilities with non-residents (arising from movements in 
their prices and in exchange rates)1 and to other adjustments,2 
which more than offset a decline in the positive balance, in line 
with the nation’s financing capacity, in net financial transactions 
(€2.8 billion).
The breakdown into assets and liabilities shows that, excluding 
financial derivatives, between January and June 2016, residents 
again acquired, in net terms, a large volume of foreign assets. 
When combined with the valuation changes and the (small) 
negative other changes in volume, this led to an increase in the 
amount of assets vis-à-vis the rest of the world equivalent to 9.1% 
of GDP in the first half (see Panel 2). The net investment of non-
residents in the Spanish economy (excluding the Banco de 
España) was also positive, albeit smaller, so that the positive 
balance in the financial account of the balance of payments, 
excluding the central bank, easily exceeded the current and capital 
account surplus, which was reflected in a very negative amount of 
net financial transactions of the Banco de España with the rest of 
the world (–7.7% of GDP in the first half of the year, see Panels 2 
and 3). These developments continued to be influenced by the 
ECB’s quantitative easing policy, which has generated excess 
liquidity within the euro area, prompting financial flows between 
the countries of the area.3 In line with developments on the asset 
side, the movements in the prices of financial instruments and in 
exchange rates had overall a negative (although minor) impact on 
the valuation of liabilities with non-residents. In net terms, financial 
derivatives also contributed to an increase in the IIP, basically due 
to valuation effects.
The institutional sector breakdown shows that the decline in the 
negative net IIP relative to GDP resulted from the reduction in the 
net debtor positions of monetary financial institutions other than 
the Banco de España and of other resident sectors, in line with the 
financing capacity of the resident private sector as a whole, which 
more than offset the increase (of 3.4 pp) in the net debtor position 
of the Banco de España, while there was barely any change in that 
of general government (see Chart 16 in the main text of the Spanish 
version of this report). Excluding the Banco de España, these 
liabilities declined more sharply (by 4.8 pp, to 74.5% of GDP).
The functional category breakdown shows that, excluding the 
Banco de España, all the categories contributed to a reduction in 
the net debtor position of the Spanish economy in the first half 
(see Panel 4). Thus, the net debtor position in direct investment fell 
by 0.4 pp, to 4.4% of GDP, in portfolio investment by 3.9 pp, to 
52.3% of GDP, and in other investment by 1 pp, to 17% of GDP.4 
Within direct investment, there was a notable increase in the 
amount of external assets of residents (specifically, of non-
financial sectors) in the form of shares and other equity and debt 
securities, which was somewhat higher than that in liabilities vis-à-
vis non-residents. With regard to portfolio investment, the fall in 
the amount of external assets of resident agents was more than 
offset by the reduction in their liabilities vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world. The sector breakdown shows mixed behaviour. Specifically, 
on one hand, the non-residents’ holdings of assets issued by 
monetary financial institutions and, to a lesser extent, by other 
resident sectors declined again, in line with their current 
deleveraging process. In contrast, non-residents’ public debt 
holdings increased, although more moderately than in previous 
years, against a background in which the Eurosystem, under its 
asset purchase programme, continued to acquire this type of 
securities. Finally, the decline in the net debtor position in other 
investment was a result of the increase in the amount of residents’ 
external assets and the decline in their external liabilities.
To improve the assessment of the degree of vulnerability 
associated with the Spanish economy’s international position it is 
worth supplementing the IIP information with other indicators such 
as the volume of gross external debt (which only includes liabilities 
that generate payment obligations; in Spain around 75% of the 
total).5 Gross external debt increased by 3 pp to 171.4% of GDP 
between December 2015 and June 2016, as the increase in the 
external debt of the Banco de España (by 4.9 pp, to 32.8% GDP) 
was greater than the decline in that of the rest of the other sectors 
(see Panel 5). The external debt of other financial institutions, 
excluding the Banco de España, and of other resident sectors 
declined, over the same period, by 1.3 pp and by 0.7 pp of GDP, 
to 39.6% and 27.4%, respectively.6 In contrast, the external debt of 
general government increased by somewhat less than 2%, in line with 
GDP growth, so that its weight relative to GDP barely changed, 
remaining close to 51%. At the same time, the breakdown by 
original maturity continues to show a high weight for long-term 
BOX 5THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION IN SPAIN: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
1  Specifically, as mentioned in the next paragraph, there was a reduction 
in the value of the assets and liabilities vis-à-vis the rest of the world (and 
also an increase in the negative net position in derivatives largely linked 
to valuation effects). These falls stemmed both from changes in the 
prices of the various financial instruments and, to a larger extent in 
the case of assets, from movements in the euro exchange rate against 
other currencies.
2  Other changes in volume are included here.
3  In particular, the liquidity generated in Spain by the ECB’s quantitative 
easing measures has largely been channelled abroad. Thus, since the 
end of 2014, the net acquisition of external assets by resident agents 
has increased, while the flows of net liabilities vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world, excluding the Banco de España, have decreased. For further 
details, see the article “The Eurosystem quantitative easing measures 
and the financial account”, Banco de España, Economic Bulletin, April 
2016.
4  The net debtor position in financial derivatives increased slightly in that 
period, from 0.2% to 0.8% of GDP.
5  The external debt of a country comprises the amounts of all liabilities 
vis-à-vis non-residents that involve the future payments of principal, 
interest or both (all financial instruments, except equity holdings and 
financial derivatives).
6  Excluding direct investment in the form of debt instruments.
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BOX 5 THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION IN SPAIN: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (cont’d)
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SOURCES: Banco de España.
a The net IIP is the difference betwen the value of the external assets of resident sectors and the value of liabilities with the rest of the world.
b Total change between January and June 2016. In Panels 2 and 3, GDP is that of the first half of 2016. 
c Excluding financial derivatives.
d Excluiding Banco de España and the net position in derivatives.
e External debt comprises the stock of all liabilties that give rise to future payments of principal, interest or both (i.e. all financial instruments other than own funds 
and financial derivatives). 
f Includes only direct investment in the form of debt.
g Excluding the Banco de España and direct investment in the form of debt.
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liabilities (almost 75% of the total, excluding those of the Banco de 
España, see Panel 6), which normally involve a lower refinancing risk.
In the future, the still high net debtor position of the Spanish 
economy vis-à-vis the rest of the world entails a significant 
element of vulnerability, insofar as the substantial net borrowing 
needs generated by this position exposes the economy to possible 
turbulence in the financial markets. This underlines the importance 
of extending the current path of decline in the international debtor 
position, for which purpose it is necessary to obtain recurrent 
external surpluses and to persevere with the competitiveness 
gains that make them possible.
BOX 5 THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION IN SPAIN: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (cont’d)
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On 30 November 2016 the ECB released the results of the 15th 
edition of its survey on the access to finance of SMEs in the euro 
area (SAFE) covering the period between April 2016 and September 
2016. The firms surveyed, essentially SMEs, are asked how their 
economic and financial situation, their external financing needs, 
the availability of financing and the conditions of the financing 
received or rejected have changed over the past six months.
The latest survey data show that, overall, the economic situation 
of Spanish SMEs has continued to improve. Thus, the number of 
firms reporting an increase in sales was once again much higher 
than the number of firms reporting a drop in sales, with a relative 
difference between the two groups (net percentage) of 19%, 
similar to that observed in the euro area and 1 pp lower than the 
figure for the previous six months (see Panel 1). The profit 
performance was somewhat less favourable, owing to the increase 
both in labour and other costs, a circumstance that was reported 
by a high net proportion of the sample (37% and 36%, respectively, 
compared with 44% and 37% in the euro area). Thus, the proportion 
of firms that reported an increase in profits was barely 2 pp higher 
than that which reported a drop in profits, similar to the figure 
recorded six months earlier. In the euro area, the percentage of 
SMEs reporting an increase in profits was the same as that of SMEs 
reporting a fall in profits. In addition, according to the survey 
results, the deleveraging process of Spanish SMEs continued in 
the most recent period. Thus, the net proportion of SMEs that 
BOX 6RECENT CHANGES IN ACCESS OF SPANISH SMES TO EXTERNAL FINANCING IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE ECB’S HALF-YEARLY SURVEY 
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reported a decrease in their debt ratio (measured as the ratio of 
total debt to assets) was 8%, 1 pp less than in the previous survey 
and in line with that observed for the euro area.
The percentage of Spanish SMEs that classed access to external 
financing as the most pressing problem for their business fell 
again, continuing to be the factor, among all those included in the 
question, cited by the lowest number of firms (9% of the total, a 
proportion similar to that of the euro area and the lowest figure 
recorded since the survey was launched in 2009). The lack of 
customers was the predominant concern (selected by 31% of 
firms), followed by competition (18%).
In this setting, the bank financing needs of Spanish SMEs fell in 
net terms for 3% of these firms, compared with the increase of 2% 
recorded six months earlier and the 1% rise observed in the euro 
area as a whole for this segment. In line with these results, the 
proportion of Spanish SMEs that requested bank loans fell by 
some 2 pp, down to 30%, similar to the figure reported for the euro 
area (29%).
In turn, the availability of bank financing continued to improve (see 
Panel 2).Thus, in net terms, 26% of firms reported an increase in this 
respect, 4 pp less than in the previous survey and 15 pp above the 
figure for their euro area peers. In addition, SMEs perceived positive 
developments in most factors affecting the supply of credit. 
Specifically, in net terms, 32% of firms reported greater willingness 
of banks to provide credit (7 pp less than in the previous survey) 
and 16% signalled an improvement in the overall economic 
outlook (similar to that reported six months earlier).
The proportion of Spanish SMEs whose requests for bank financing 
were rejected rose by 2 pp compared with the previous six months, 
standing at 7%, identical to the figure for the euro area as a whole. 
When a broader indicator of obstacles in obtaining bank loans is 
considered1, those difficulties affected 12% of Spanish SMEs, 
which is slightly more than for the euro area (11%) and similar to 
the figure reported in the previous survey (see Panel 3).
Regarding financing conditions, the net percentage of Spanish 
SMEs that reported a drop in interest rates was positive for the 
fourth consecutive six-month period, standing at a high 30%, 
10  pp less than in the previous period (see Panel 4). Thus, the 
average interest rate applied to these firms on credit lines or bank 
overdrafts fell by 50 bp to 3.5%. In addition, the net proportion of 
firms that reported an increase in loan amount and loan maturity 
remained positive (19% and 5%, respectively). In contrast, these 
firms continued to perceive a tightening of collateral requirements 
(8%) and of other terms and conditions of financing such as 
commissions (14%).
To conclude, the latest SAFE shows that, between April 2016 and 
September 2016, access of Spanish SMEs to external financing 
continued to improve, and only a small number of firms reported 
this as their most pressing problem, while finding customers 
continued to be the predominant concern for the majority. As their 
financial position became progressively sounder and their bank 
financing needs declined somewhat, these firms reported, overall, 
that in the aforementioned period they identified an increase in the 
availability of credit and perceived a greater willingness of banks 
to grant loans on more favourable conditions and an improvement 
in the overall economic outlook. Lastly, the survey results also 
show that Spanish SMEs expected the availability of bank credit 
to improve in the period October 2016 to March 2017.
BOX 6 RECENT CHANGES IN ACCESS OF SPANISH SMES TO EXTERNAL FINANCING IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE ECB’S HALF-YEARLY SURVEY (cont’d)
1  This indicator reflects the proportion of firms in any of the following 
situations: firms whose applications for financing were rejected; firms 
that did not receive all the funding they had requested; firms that 
received bank loans but at what they considered to be a very high cost; 
and firms that did not request financing because they believed it would 
probably not be approved (fear of rejection).
